Grand Super Cycle National Bankruptcies

Part III

Fall of the Roman Republic

 

By

 

Joseph M. Miller

jmiller585@mchsi.com

 

Daan Joubert

daaj@kingsley.co.za

 

Marion Butler

juneb01@msn.com

 

“For what shall it profit a man, if he should gain the whole world and lose his own soul?”              - Jesus Christ, St. Mark 8:36

 

URLs for previous articles in this series are provided at the end.

 

In Part II we discussed Classical Greece during the first 3-century Grand Super Cycle of the Roman Period (labeled GSC1) and its aftermath (GSC2).  During these centuries the city of Rome grew from an insignificant village on the banks of the Tiber to the leading city of central Italy.  In this article, Part III of the series, we will discuss the Roman Republic during the second Grand Super Cycle (GSC3), from 390 to 91 BC, and its aftermath (GSC4), from 91 to 31 BC.

 

In the three centuries following the occupation of the city of Rome by the Gauls in 390, Rome became a world power and mistress of the Mediterranean world.  As we mentioned in Part I, it is difficult to choose the exact ending date of GSC3 (and beginning of GSC4) because the period of Rome’s expansion overlaps, to a large degree, the events that ripped her apart internally.  This is demonstrated in Table 1 (showing dates of Roman acquisitions) and Table 2 (showing the conflicts that destroyed the Republic).

 

Table I: Non-Italian Provinces Acquired by Rome

 

Table 2: Events Leading to the Fall of the Republic

 

From the above two tables we can see the parallel developments of increasing Roman dominion over the Mediterranean and increasing civil strife at home.  This strife was between Rome and her allies, between Rome and her slaves, between the upper and lower classes, and finally between Octavian and Anthony, members of the Second Triumvirate who had divided the Roman world between them.  The causes of this strife are beyond the scope of this article, but it should be apparent that the numerous Roman conquests to 146 BC (see Table 1) exacerbated underlying stresses, which already existed between the various levels of Roman society, and these stresses became more severe as time went on.  

 

Money and Debt under the Republic

 

The unit of account (ie. the denomination used in contracts and financial statements) under the early Republic was the As, originally a Roman pound of bronze. According to Pliny the Elder, the As was reduced to 2 ounces during the First Punic War, and reduced to 1 ounce (1/12 pound) in the Second Punic War.  Pliny tells us that these debasements effected reductions in Rome’s debts of 5/6 and 1/2 respectively (5: Frank, p.79 & p.72).  During the late Republic, the basic monetary system was:

 

1 Denarius (4 grams silver) = 4 Sesterces

1 Sestersius (1 gram silver) = 4 Asses

 

During the final years of the Republic, the sestersius (abbreviation = HS) was adopted as the unit of account, and most financial figures of the later Republic and Empire are therefore denominated “HS”.  No bronze coinage was produced in the last 50 years of the Republic, and the authority to mint silver coinage after 49 BC passed largely from the Senate to the hands of the generals who controlled the huge armies vying for control of the Roman world (1: p.2).

 

The government did not borrow money except on rare occasions.  Individual borrowing, however, was a regular feature of Roman life, and this private debt reached crisis proportions at times.  Severe debt and liquidity crises occurred in 193-2 BC, the 80s BC, 63 BC, and 49 BC  (7: Andreau, p.102).  To provide one extreme example of the scale of individual debt, we are told that Julius Caesar incurred debts of HS25 million during his quest for public office to 61 BC (7: Andreau, p.144).  This is an astronomical sum considering that a craftsman’s daily wage was about HS4 (1 denarius). 

 

Revenues and Costs of the Republic

 

As Roman territory increased, so did the revenue of the state, which has been estimated at HS4-8 million in the 3^rd century BC, HS50-60 million in 150 BC (3: Hopkins, p.6),

50 million denarii (HS200 million) in 70 BC, and 85 million denarii (HS340 million) after Pompey’s conquests in the 60’s BC (9: Plut. Pompey, [45]).   For perspective, the HS200 million revenue in 70 BC was equal to about 200 million grams silver or some 6.4 million troy ounces.  This would be equivalent to about 7,750 Athenian talents (829.5 ounces per talent), roughly four times the peak revenues of the Athenian Empire.

 

State expenses were minimal in the early days of the Republic.  Administrative costs were negligible, as city magistrates served without pay, and there was no standing army.  Soldiers served without pay, as they were propertied citizens (minimum net worth requirement of 11,000 asses), protecting the state and their own property under a militia system.  These citizen soldiers also provided the state with some public construction services such as the repair of walls.  During the war with Veii, 405-396 BC, extended military service forced the state to begin paying soldiers an annual stipend, which was 120 denarii (HS480) in the later Republic (5: Frank, p.188).  In 46 BC Julius Caesar increased soldier’s pay to 225 denarii (HS900) (5: Frank, p.336).  As Roman conquests grew, the militia system broke down in 105 BC, soldiers were enlisted for terms up to 16 years, and the property requirement was reduced to 4,000 asses (10: Preston, p. 41).  Since the as had meanwhile been reduced to 1/12 its former value, the composition of the legions was effectively changed from middle class to working class.  In the later Republic, according to Cicero’s letters, there were normally 3 legions stationed in Syria, Asia, Bithynia, Africa, Spain, and Cisalpine Gaul – 18 legions total (5: Frank, p.196).  And this standing army did not include extraordinary levies during wartime, which was virtually constant in the later Republic.  The total number of legions averaged 23 from 80 to 60 BC, and 25 legions from 60 to 50 BC (6: Frank, p.237).  In the civil wars of the last two decades of the Republic, the number of legions reached a maximum of 70 or more (6: Frank, p.334).

 

By the end of the Republic, a Roman legion contained 5,500 legionaries, with an allied contingent of similar size.  Based on legionary pay of HS900, Richard Duncan-Jones calculates the annual cost of 33 legions (including allied contingents, the Praetorian Guard, and navy) in the early Empire at HS450 million (4: Duncan-Jones, p.34).  Removing the cost of the Praetorian Guard and navy (HS36 million), the cost of 33 legions (with allied contingents) was HS414 million.  This implies that a legion (with its allied contingent) cost HS12.5 million annually at the HS900 pay rate. (Note that officers earned substantially more than legionaries.)  The cost per legion at the previous HS480 pay rate would be HS6.7 million.  Accordingly, we deduce that the Republican standing army of 18 legions cost approximately HS120 million per year before 46 BC, and HS225 million after 46 BC.  These figures are only estimates, but we think it is safe to assume that the 18 permanent legions consumed the majority of state revenue.

 

To state one example of extraordinary military costs above and beyond the standing army, in 67 BC the Senate gave Pompey HS144 million to prosecute a war against Mediterranean pirates (8: Kallet-Marx, p.317) – a figure representing about 70% of the annual state revenue.  (Pompey raised a force of 120,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 500 ships to fight over 1,000 pirate corsairs.)  This example is particularly important because (as we mentioned in Part II) Italy was dependant on imported grain.  Piracy had become so widespread that trade was severely disrupted, and Roman grain shipments were being cut off, thus threatening the state.  For readers interested in the details, Plutarch’s biography of Pompey, at http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/pompey.html, relates Pompey’s war against the pirates on pages 14-17. 

 

The navy was allowed to deteriorate dramatically in the decade after 60 BC, but there are no exact figures on numbers or costs (6: Frank, p.328).  On a per ship basis, we do know that naval costs were less expensive for Rome than they had been for the Greeks, because Rome utilized slave crews.  “Legionaries of the regular army (about 80-100 per ship) were put on board to do the fighting, and for crews slaves and freedmen were commandeered, except that in the East the cities that gave the vessels usually had to provide the crews as well.” (6: Frank, p.336)

 

State welfare constituted another major expenditure making an appearance in the later Republic.  During the era of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus (see Table 2) grain was made available to Roman citizens at half price, and after 58 BC free grain was distributed.  This provided the masses with a measure of the imperial spoils, placating them after a long period of class strife.  The grain dole “cost not over 2,000,000 denarii from 63 to 58, about 16,000,000 after 58 plus an extra sum of 2,000,000 per year from 56 to 51, and the numbers of recipients rose constantly till 46, when the cost was reduced to about 9,000,000 denarii per year.” (6: Frank, p.330)    

 

The Final Decades of the Republic

 

Rome’s Italian allies, after half a century of futile attempts to gain Roman citizenship, broke with Rome in 91 BC and established their own Italian Republic.  This new nation was destroyed in the Social War, 91-88 BC, but the price of Roman victory was high.  The Roman treasury was depleted, both sides suffered high loss of life (about 100,000 each), and the Italians were granted the citizenship they had craved in the first place.  See              www.ualberta.ca/~csmackay/CLASS_366/Social.War.html for details.

 

During the Social War, businesses and farms in war-torn regions did not produce income, and the owners of these enterprises could not pay their creditors.  Since land-owning aristocrats and middle class businessmen relied heavily on debt financing, there was financial chaos in Rome.  Government attempts to solve the liquidity and debt crisis only made things worse.  “In 89 a praetor, A. Sepronius Asellio, had attempted to relieve the stringency and prevent foreclosures, apparently by trying to resuscitate an obsolete law against the taking of interest.  Riots, incited by a tribune, ensued in which the money lenders of the Forum became violent, and the praetor was killed.” (6: Frank, p.268)  To increase liquidity and help finance the war, starting in 91 BC the government issued silver-plated bronze denarii, and this created high price inflation for five years, until the plated coin was demonetized.  “Coins fluctuated so much in value in that period that no one could tell what he was worth.” (6: Frank: pp.266-7)  The government was in dire financial straights, and essentially lost control over its treasury.  “During the Social War the state confessed to complete bankruptcy, and in the Sullan Wars that followed Sulla deliberately adopted the Oriental theory of autocracy, compelled the state to give him absolute power over life and property, and confiscated sacred, public, and private property whenever he was in need.  His purse served as state treasury for several years and he appropriated whatever he needed to keep it replenished.” (6: Frank, p.231)

 

Taking advantage of conditions in Italy, King Mithridates of Pontus invaded Rome’s Asia Province in 89 BC, seized all Roman property in the East, and in one day killed every Roman and Italian he could find, some 80,000 citizens and possibly 70,000 slaves.  Mithridates then entered Greece, where he was hailed in many quarters as a savior, and killed another 20,000 Italians.  Rome chose Sulla to retaliate and prosecute the war with Pontus, the First Mithridatic War, 89-84 BC.  With the Roman treasury empty, Sulla took 9,000 pounds of gold from Roman temple treasure to finance the early months of the war (4: Duncan-Jones, p.9).  With no funding available from Rome, Sulla financed his operations by selling captives and seizing temple treasure in Delphi, Olympia, and Epidaurus (6: Frank, p.232).  To punish Greek cities for adherence to Mithridates, Sulla then imposed tribute of HS480 million in Greece (8: Kallet-Marx, p.266), which required mortgaging of much of the property there. It took Greece a generation to recover from this huge financial loss.

 

When Sulla left Italy with his army in 87 BC to deal with Mithridates, the bankrupt government in Rome used existing debtor laws to eliminate three-fourths of its debts (6: Frank, p.232).  Meanwhile, Sulla’s long-time rival, Marius, seized power in Rome.  Marius overthrew the constitution, outlawed Sulla, and began a reign of terror, killing every aristocrat he could lay his hands on.  Sulla defeated Mithridates and forced him to abandon his recent conquests. Mithridates surrendered to Sulla a fleet of 70 ships and the sum of 3,000 talents (see Mithridates url below).  In 83 BC Sulla returned to Italy with his five legions and fought the followers of Marius (who had recently died).  The younger Marius funded the democratic side of the war by taking 14,000 pounds of gold and 6,000 pounds of silver from the Capitoline temple (6: Frank, p.265).  The democrats were defeated in 82 BC and Sulla was named permanent dictator in 81.  He sent his subordinate Pompey to crush the democrats remaining in Sicily, Africa, and western Spain, while Sulla instituted his own reign of terror in Rome, killing every democrat he could find.  During the reigns of terror of both Marius and Sulla, one source of funding was confiscation of the property of their respective political enemies (6: Frank, p.298).  After three years in power Sulla believed the Senate was no longer in danger of being overthrown, and he resigned in 79 BC, allowing free elections.  Sulla died the following year, and the head of the democratic party, Lepidus, was elected as consul.  Lepidus and his followers attempted another overthrow of the constitution, and were destroyed by Pompey in 77.  For readers interested in details of the First Mithridatic War and Roman Civil War, see the biographies of Mithridates, Sulla, and Marius:

 

Mithridates: www.soa.org.uk/main/resource/coins/mithridates.htm.

Sulla: http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/sylla.html.

Marius: http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/c_marius.html.

 

Between the Social War and Roman Civil War, Rome had spent a decade engaged in internecine warfare on Italian soil, with opposing sides expending all available resources on their respective causes.   The loss of human life and the damage to Italian property in the 80’s BC were immense, and many individuals had been ruined.  The Republic had survived the tumultuous decade, but it was financially and politically weakened. 

 

During the 70’s, Roman legions continued to fight wars in the provinces, but Italy enjoyed a long period of peace marred only by the Third Servile War (73-71 BC).  During this war an army of escaped slaves under the gladiator Spartacus terrorized southern Italy and defeated the two consuls in battle.  By 72 BC Spartacus commanded a force of 120,000 that roamed at will in Italy.  Rome raised an army of six new legions, commanded by Crassus, who was also given the four existing consular legions in Italy.  The legions in Spain and Macedonia were also recalled to Italy.  In 71 BC Crassus destroyed the army of Spartacus and ended the revolt, during which over 100,000 ex-slaves lost their lives.  We cannot quantify the cost of the war, but the economic damage must have been sizeable, with so many slaves lost by their owners and out ravishing the countryside.  See www.vroma.org/~bmcmanus/spartacus.html for details.  In spite of the war, Rome’s finances recovered somewhat in the 70’s, and improved significantly after Pompey’s conquests in the 60’s. 

 

Julius Caesar was an aristocrat by birth.  Politically he was a democrat twice related to Marius via marital connections.  (Sulla had supposedly said of him, “There is more than one Marius in that boy.”)  After Sulla died, Caesar returned to Rome and worked to rebuild the democratic party.  In 60 BC Caesar allied himself with Pompey and Crassus, and this informal association (which represented something of truce between opposing factions of the previous civil war) ruled Rome as the First Triumvirate from 60 to 53 BC. 

 

From 58 to 51 BC Caesar engaged in the conquest of Gaul.  During his campaigns some 400,000 Gauls were killed, and a similar number of captives were sold as slaves, providing Caesar with about HS400 million in proceeds (6: Frank, p.325).  He plundered a considerable amount of gold as well, including temple treasure (4: Duncan-Jones, p.9).  Little of this money, if any, found its way into the Roman treasury.  Caesar kept it for his own purposes and to pay his personal creditors.  “Julius Caesar provided the ugliest example in Roman history of provincial looting for personal gain.” (6: Frank, p.325)    

 

In 54 BC Crassus invaded Parthia with 39,000 men, and the following year he was defeated at Carrhae by the Parthian horse archers who destroyed the legions at long range.  Less than 5,000 soldiers returned home from the campaign, with 10,000 captured and enslaved, and the balance killed.  Crassus was among the slain, and the First Triumvirate died with him.  The invasion earned Rome the undying hatred of the Parthians, who continued the war with sporadic and inconclusive invasions of Syria until 38 BC.

 

In 52 BC Pompey seized power in Rome, partly due to anarchy at Rome and partly out of jealousy over Caesar’s success.  The Senate passed laws by which Caesar’s military and political powers would lapse on March 1, 49 BC, and Caesar was ordered to return to Rome.  Caesar marched on Rome with a legion instead, crossing the Rubicon River in Italy on January 11, 49 BC.  Pompey fled Rome with a good portion of the Senate, and Caesar occupied Rome, seizing HS48 million in sacred treasure in the city (6: Frank, p.338).  At the start of the Great Roman Civil War, Pompey and the Senate controlled seven legions in Spain, ten or more in Asia, Africa, and Greece, and two in Italy, with eight more in the process of being mobilized.  Caesar commanded eight legions in Transalpine Gaul, in addition to the legion he had with him.  Since Pompey controlled the Roman navy, Caesar built 150 ships in 49 BC.  Pompey was defeated at the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 and Caesar was declared Dictator for Life in 47.  In 46 BC Caesar raised HS600 million, “from the sale of booty after laying heavy requisitions on Spain, Egypt, Asia, and Italy, but the treasury was then only one of his own pockets.” (6: Frank, p.326)  When the last Pompeian army was defeated in 45, Caesar was in total control of the state, and the Republic existed in name only.  Approximately 100,000 Roman citizens had died in the Great Roman Civil War.  See http://heraklia.fws1.com/civil_war/index.html for details on the war and a biography of Caesar.

 

Caesar was assassinated by republican senators on March 15, 44 BC, after he began promoting the idea that he receive the title Rex (king).  Octavian and Anthony (Caesar’s great-nephew and lieutenant, respectively) then engaged in a power struggle for Caesar’s legacy.  Octavian offered Anthony’s legionaries HS2,000 each to switch sides, and Anthony was forced to match the offer.  To fund this bonus, as well the regular pay of his troops, Anthony seized HS500 million of the HS700 million balance in the treasury (from Caesars forced tribute in 46 BC) (6: Frank, pp.338-40).  Octavian and Anthony came to terms in 43 BC, forming the Second Triumvirate with Lepidus as the third member, and seized power in Rome.  Some 300 senators and 2,000 knights (middle class) were proscribed and their property confiscated, and the property of 400 wealthy women was expropriated.  The triumvirs also imposed a 2% capital tax, a tax of HS100 on each slave, and forced loans from wealthy citizens.  Prior to the triumvirs’ seizure of power, the republican Senate had attempted to raise taxes of 4% on capital, plus 10 asses for every roof-tile in Rome.  After the triumvirs seized power, republican forces under Brutus and Cassius seized the wealth of the eastern provinces from Syria to Macedonia.  They demanded that ten years worth of tribute be paid over two years, and destroyed some cities that did not comply (6: Frank, pp.340-1).  In total, the Second Triumvirate controlled 34 legions, while the republicans controlled 19.  In 42 BC the Second Triumvirate army of 85,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry defeated the republican army of 80,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry; and once victorious, the Second Triumvirate split the Roman world between them.  Octavian controlled the provinces west of Greece, Anthony controlled the East, and Lepidus controlled Africa.  After the war Anthony demanded that his provinces pay him the same ten years of tribute they had paid the republicans.  After much protest, Anthony settled for nine years.  “Asia was bankrupt for a generation.” (6: Frank, p.341)

 

Sextus, the youngest son of Pompey, still had control of some three hundred ships, the bulk of the republican navy, and with this force he gained control of Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, and the Peloponnese.  In order to fight Sextus, from 40 to 36 BC, Octavian borrowed ships from Anthony in exchange for loaning Anthony some legions for a renewed invasion of Parthia.  To fund the war Octavian imposed a tax of HS50 per slave in 39 BC, and imposed tribute of 1,600 talents on Sicily when Sextus was defeated in 36 (6: Frank, p.341).  Anthony now invaded Parthia with a force of 60,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.  Anthony was defeated by the Parthian horse archers in a fashion similar to the Battle of Carrhae.  Unlike Crassus, Anthony managed to escape, but lost 30,000 men in the process.

 

Anthony and Octavian had a falling out in 33 BC over Anthony’s relationship with Cleopatra, Queen of Egypt.  In 32 BC Anthony was stripped of his triumviral power, and the Senate declared war on Cleopatra – but not Anthony.  To block a possible Roman invasion, Anthony and Cleopatra moved an army to Greece, which consisted of 73,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry.  Their fleet of some 480 ships, larger than Roman warships, had crews totaling almost 150,000 men.  To oppose this force, Octavian assembled an army of 80,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, and a navy of more than 400 ships.  To help finance the war, Octavian levied a tax on the capital of freedmen and a tax of three months’ income on agriculture (4: Duncan-Jones, p.8).  On September 2, 31 BC the two fleets fought at Actium.  Anthony was initially successful, but his center and left wing fled or surrendered after a brief fight.  Anthony and Cleopatra escaped to Egypt with a handful of ships, while the Antonine land army mutinied and surrendered.  Octavian’s army advanced through Greece and the East, and each Antonine force they encountered surrendered.  Octavian invaded Egypt in July 30 BC, and Anthony and Cleopatra committed suicide.

 

Octavian took control of Egypt and stripped the Egyptian elite of their wealth and property, including virtually all existing temple treasure (which Cleopatra had already conveniently removed for state use) (4: Duncan-Jones, p.9).  The sum of money seized was so great that interest rates in Rome dropped 60% (4: Duncan-Jones, p.21).  Octavian returned to Rome in complete control of the state, taking the semi-godly title Augustus in 27 BC.  The Republic was officially dead.  Of the roughly 1,000 ships of all types engaged on both sides in the war against Anthony, Octavian retained personal ownership of some 700 after the war.   Of the sixty legions in the field at the end of the war, Octavian disbanded all but twenty-eight (11: Montgomery, p.109); and he created the 10,000-man Praetorian Guard as a private army to control Rome and Italy.  Octavian claimed to have spent HS600 million to purchase land for the discharged soldiers (6: Frank, p.322).

 

Conclusion

 

In the introduction to this series (Part I) we said that while financial ruin of the state was usually a direct or indirect cause of the fall of government in Grand Super Cycle declines, this was not the case in the fall of the Roman Republic.  Upon further reflection we realize that this statement was not true.  There was a distinct causal relationship between the bankruptcy of the state and the fall of the Republic.  The bankruptcy of the state in the Social War, followed immediately by two more wars, resulted in Sulla’s dictatorship.  Sulla did restore free elections, it is true.  And in spite of the terrible things he did, he does appear to have been motivated by a desire to preserve the Republic, not destroy it.  Nevertheless, in his dictatorship the person of the executive merged with the treasury function of the state.  There was no distinction.  And this set an example that others would follow, to the ruin of the Republic.

 

There are important similarities between the fall of the Roman Republic and the fall of the Athenian Empire that are worth mentioning.  In both cases financial difficulties were due to extended wartime expenditure that was greater than government revenue.  In both cases the government expended all reserves, imposed extraordinary taxes at home, used armed force to levy funds in subject states, utilized borrowing, and resorted to the use of sacred treasures in the extremity of their financial distress.  In both cases, money was used to tempt soldiers or sailors to switch sides.  Both cases saw disruption to the monetary system, with utilization of silver-plated coin.  In both cases there was high population loss, and in both cases the government fell.  The main difference, of course, is that Athens lost her empire while Rome became one. 

 

While it is inappropriate to say that Rome was financially ruined at the end of the GSC decline, most of the Mediterranean world was.  Rome’s appetite for money was enormous in the long and ruinous wars, and someone had to pay the price at every turn.  Perhaps the best way to express it is to say that Rome conferred her bankruptcy on everyone else.  In the end, of course, Rome was the entire Mediterranean world, so the loss of human and financial resources became her own losses.

 

Regarding the human toll, around 70 BC the population controlled by Rome is estimated at 50 to 60 million, of which 910,000 males held citizenship.  In 28 BC the population of the Roman Empire is estimated at 45 million, including 4 million citizens (both male and female) (2).  Bear in mind that from 70 BC to 28 BC Rome had added several Asian territories plus Gaul and Egypt, so the population decline was much larger than the figures indicate.

 

Elliott Waves measure wealth.  They are not ostensibly about ethics and moral philosophy, yet we find ourselves continuously drawn back to this issue, which appears to be intimately related to the prosperity of nations.  For example, the assassination of Cicero by agents of the Second Triumvirate, for his public commentaries ripping Mark Anthony, brings to mind the execution of Socrates for questioning the wisdom of Athenians.  They simply did away with their critics.

 

Cicero addressed the Roman moral decline as follows.  “As long as the imperium of the Roman people was maintained by conferring benefits rather than inflicting harm, our wars were waged either on behalf of our allies or to uphold our imperium, and their conclusion was either moderate or no harsher than necessary.  The Senate was a haven of refuge for kings, cities and tribes, while our magistrates and commanders sought the height of glory in one thing only, the protection of the provinces and allies by treating them fairly and responsibly.  Therefore in those days we might more accurately be said to have exercised a guardianship over the whole world than imperium.  Gradually, however, even before Sulla’s time, we began to loosen the old standards of behavior and morality, and after his victory we gave them up altogether.  For no act against the allies seems any longer to be unjust after such violence was perpetrated against our fellow citizens.” (8: Kallet-Marx, p.335)

 

Back in 458 BC, in the early years of the Republic, Cincinnatus had been named dictator of Rome.  He had defeated the Aequi, resigned the dictatorship before it was set to expire, and returned home to his plow.  The behavior of Cincinnatus set the standard of Roman civic virtue that lasted for centuries, but this civic virtue was non-existent in the last decades of the Republic.  It was replaced, for the most part, with lust for personal power; and this power lust, perhaps more than anything, destroyed the Roman Republic.

 

Sources

 

1. Introduction to Roman Coins. www.usask.ca/antiquities/coins/roman_coins.html

 

2. Population Figures. www.personal.kent.edu/~bkharvey/roman/population.htm

 

3. Hopkins, Keith. On the Political Economy of the Roman Empire. www.stanford.edu/group/sshi/empires/hopkins.pdf

 

4. Duncan-Jones, Richard. Money and Government in the Roman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

 

5. Frank, Tenney. An Economic History of Rome. New York: Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1962.

 

6. Frank, Tenny. An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, Vol. I. Paterson: Pageant Books, Inc., 1959.

 

7. Andreau, Jean. Banking and Business in the Roman World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

 

8. Kallet-Marx, Robert Morstein. Hegemony to Empire, The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

 

9. Plutarch.  Fall of the Roman Republic. New York: Penguin Classics, 1984. 

 

10. Preston, Richard A. and Sydney F. Wise. Men In Arms, a History of Warfare and Its Interrelationship with Western Society. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.

 

11. Montgomery, Field-Marshal Viscount. A History of Warfare. Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1968.

 

For readers interested in this period, we recommend The First Man in Rome and it sequel, The Grass Crown, by Colleen McCullough.   These novels primarily cover the careers of Marius and Sulla.

 

A timeline from 133 –30 BC is available at: www.ualberta.ca/~csmackay/CLASS_366/timeline.html. 

A biography of Octavian is at www.roman-emperors.org/auggie.htm.

The Cicero Homepage is at www.utexas.edu/depts/classics/documents/Cic.html.  

A url for the Roman navy: www.crystalinks.com/romenavy.html.

 

Various sources were used in providing armed force totals in the different wars, and not all are listed here.  Occasionally different sources gave different figures, and we then had to choose what seemed most reliable.  (This was sometimes also true regarding financial figures, by the way.)  We did not think it beneficial to footnote the armed force totals, except the reduction from 60 to 28 legions at the end of the Republic, since this number will be critical to understanding the Empire’s budget, to be discussed in Part IV.

 

Previous Articles in this Series

 

Part I: Introduction:

www.freebuck.com/articles/elliott/030104bankruptcies1.htm

Part II: Fall of the Athenian Empire:

www.freebuck.com//articles/elliott/030113nakruptcies1.htm.

 

© copyright 2003 by Joseph M. Miller, Daan Joubert and Marion Butler, all rights reserved